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Appellate Court No.: 20030096-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure because the entry of judgment denying the motion for new trial on 
January 9,2003 is considered to be the final decision of the trial court. See also, Utah 
Code §78-2a-3(2)(e). The Notice of Appeal was filed on February 3, 2003. Thus, 
pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this appeal is timely. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The first issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred when it 
accepted as nondiscriminatory, the State's explanation for using a peremptory challenge 
to exclude a Native American juror. [R. 148: 58]. This issue presents a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The second issue is whether the Court erred in denying the motion for a new trial. 
[R. 92]. If the trial court's denial was based upon the facts, it will be reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). If the 
denial is based upon a determination of law, then the issue presents a question of law, 
which is reviewed under the correctness standard. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 
P2d 937, 938 (Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. CODES AND RULES 
A. Constitutional provisions 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Sections 7, 12. 
United States Constitution, Amendment V, VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Mr. Redhorse was charged with theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code § 76-6-404. [R. 1]. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
1. A one-count Information was filed against Mr. Redhorse. [R. 1], 
2. A jury trial was held. [R. 148-149]. 
3. Mr. Redhorse was found guilty as charged [R. 86]. 
4. Mr. Redhorse moved for a new trial. [R. 92-101]. 
5. The trial court denied the motion. [R. 137-142]. 
6. Mr. Redhorse filed an appeal. [R. 143-144]. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
On September 16,2002, Mr. Redhorse was sentenced to a term of one (1) to fifteen 
2 
(15) years. Mr. Redhorse was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of three 
hundred seventy dollars ($370.00) and restitution in the amount of eight thousand dollars 
($8,000.00) plus interest. 
The prison sentence was stayed and Mr. Redhorse was placed on probation with the 
following conditions: (1) That Mr. Redhorse pay the fine and restitution at the rate of 
two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) per month; (2) That Mr. Redhorse provide a DNA 
sample; (3) That Mr. Redhorse violate no Federal, State or Municipal law; and (4) That 
Mr. Redhorse contact the court if he cannot make payments as scheduled. [R. 89-91]. 
D. Relevant Facts 
Over the course of approximately fourteen (14) years, Mr. Redhorse worked as an 
artist for Hozoni Pottery, owned by Craig Simpson. [R. 148: 85]. During that time, Mr. 
Redhorse used stencils, that he made at home and at work, with discarded manila files. 
[R. 149: 232-233]. In approximately 2001, Craig Simpson sold Hozoni Pottery to Joe 
Lyman, owner of Cedar Mesa Pottery. [R. 148:101-102]. 
Per an agreement between Mr. Simpson and Mr. Redhorse, Mr. Redhorse worked for 
Mr. Lyman for thirty days to assist with the transition of Hozoni Pottery into Cedar Mesa 
Pottery. [R. 148:136 ]. At the conclusion of the thirty-day period, Mr. Redhorse left 
with his stencils. [R. 148: 137]. Mr. Simpson and Mr. Lyman claimed that the stencils 
belonged to Cedar Mesa Pottery. [R. 148:104]. Mr. Redhorse believed the stencils were 
his. [R. 148: 244]. 
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Mr. Redhorse was ultimately charged with a second-degree felony theft, in violation 
of Utah Code § 76-6-404. He pled not guilty to the charge and a two-day jury trial was 
scheduled. 
During jury selection, Mr. Redhorse, a Native American, objected to the State's use of 
a peremptory challenge to the only full blooded Native American juror1 in a county where 
Native Americans are a distinctive group. [R. 148: 58]. The State offered the following 
explanation: 
Your Honor, I concede that Mz. [sic] Lee appears to be 
Native American. I - 1 don't know what her nationality 
would be, whether she could be some other - -but I - 1 - she 
appears to be Native American. Ah, I didn't want to take off, 
ah, to remove the juror entirely for men2, so that -that 
removed a couple of challenges that I - that I may have taken. 
Um, several of the other jurors I knew or at lease [sic] know -
have been aware of their families and different things about 
them, and so generally speaking, sometimes when I know 
someone over someone I don't know, I leave them on. 
With regard to — so looking at the others and coming down 
to four challenges, I felt that Mz. [sic] Lee was, ah, reserved, 
meek, not assertive. Ah, I watched her on several of the 
questions and when she spoke, I mink she was fairly quiet3 
'The only other juror that was Native American was Jerri Lynn Warren. She is 
one-half Native American and one-half Mexican American. [R. 148: 11]. 
2There was one male juror. [R. 148: 57]. 
3The trial court stated that it wanted to know the background of the jurors, which 
included where and how long they lived in San Juan County, their education and degrees, 
present occupation, whether married and if married, occupation of spouse, if retired, what 
occupation they retired from and if a spouse was retired, what occupation the spouse 
retired from. [R. 147: 10]. When it was her turn, Ms. Lee answered as follows: 
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and it's my desire to have someone on the jury that's willing 
to be assertive and take a stand and be - 1 mean I think that 
serves the prosecution, ah, what? Mentality or purpose more 
closely than someone who is meek and reserved. So, ah, with 
regard to that, that —that's the reason for my taking her off. I 
took her off as my third challenge. 
Defendant objected that the prosecution was not entitled to jurors that he knows. [R. 148: 
59-60]. Defendant also objected to the generalization that since Ms. Lee was meek and 
reserved, she would not take a stand. [R. 148: 60]. 
In overruling the objection, the trial court stated mat it also found Ms. Lee reserved. 
Noting that the reasons did not have to be perfect or even terrific in order to withstand a 
challenge, the trial court found that the reason of Ms. Lee being reserved was not 
I have lived in San Juan County all of my life and I live in Montezuma 
Creek, and my occupation is a Nurse Assistant, working in Cortez 
Colorado. And I'm married and my husband's working in Aztec as a truck 
driver. 
The trial court followed up as follows: 
Q. You've got at lease [sic] two years after high school; 
right? One year? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. For a Nurse's Assistant how many - how much education 
did you have to have for that: 
A. Oh, six months. 
Q. Six months. Okay. And did you graduate from High 
School? Okay. Thank you. 
[R. 148: 16]. 
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discriminatory. [R. 148: 61]. 
Mr. Redhorse was subsequently found guilty by the jury. He was sentenced to a term 
not less than one (1) year and not to exceed fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison sentence was stayed and Mr. Redhorse was placed on supervised probation for 
thirty-six (36) months. He was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of three hundred 
seventy dollars ($370.00) and restitution in the amount of eight thousand dollars 
(58,000.00). 
On September 27, 2002, Mr. Redhorse filed a motion for new trial. [R. 92]. One basis 
was juror misconduct. [R. 93]. In support of the motion, two affidavits from two jurors 
were submitted. 
Juror Shirley Pehrson stated that she overheard a conversation between Juror Amber 
Young and Juror Shawna Vigil in the jury room and that one of them made the comment 
that Mr. Redhorse was guilty during a break on the first day of trial. [R. 136 ]. 
Juror Jerri Lynn Warren stated during one of the first breaks in the waiting area, Ms. 
Vigil commented to Ms. Young that Mr. Redhorse was guilty and further stated that they 
should not be talking about the matter. [R. 100]. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Warren broke down and cried. During cross-
examination, she testified that her vote was forced by Ms. Vigil's racist attitude toward 
her during deliberations: 
Q. But what I'm asking is tell me what kind of pressure did 
they put on you. 
A. Okay. When you are told not to talk about it, you do not 
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talk about it until everything is done. Okay. They made me 
feel so low that I didn't understand what was being said or 
anything, just because of the race I am. And nobody's gonna 
stand there and tell me anything, because I know how people 
are. I've been living through racism all my life. I know what 
it feels like and I know. I had to go to school and I had to deal 
with it through school and now I deal with i t . . . And [Ms. 
Vigil] made me feel that I wasn't capable of may go [sic] a 
decision. She yelled at me and told me, "What part of guilty 
do I not understand?" I don't think he was guilty, but I didn't 
know I could change my - 1 didn't know I had the right to do 
that. 
Q. So is there something that these - so Shawna Vigil, you're 
saying, said to you, "You don't have to vote," or anything like 
that. "You have to vote this way." She said something like 
that. 
A. She made it sound like that. 
Q. How? I need to have you tell me, other than -
A. She just kept pressuring me and pressuring me and telling 
me, "What part of guilty do you not understand?" over and 
over and over. 
THE COURT: Is that what you took as being race - racially 
motivated? 
A. No. I know in my own - own words I know how people 
talk to me and I can tell they're racism. And I'm not - I'm 
not just savin' [sic] it just to help anybody out. 
THE COURT: But you do-
A. I know how it feels, and it doesn't feel too good. 
THE COURT: So what I'm asking you is do you —did you 
understand her to be acting that way toward you because of 
your race. 
A. Sorta. And I know she's — she's married into on my 
dad's side of the family, but it's — it's hard. 
[R 147:11] 
The trial court ultimately found that Ms. Warren was not credible: 
Warren's dislike for Vigil was evidence and did not appear to 
be based on facts. Warren apparently believes that Vigil is a 
racist, even though Vigil married Warren's relative. This is 
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possible, but not likely. Warren's emotional reaction when 
she accused Vigil of racism undermined her credibility. 
[R. 139]. 
With respect to Ms. Pehrson's testimony, she testified that the conversation that she 
overheard started before the deliberations, when the jury went into the jury room for a 
break. There was one break after the jury was impaneled, but that break was before any 
evidence was given. [R. 148: 58]. 
Upon cross-examination, Ms. Pehrson was clear that it did not take place during 
deliberations: 
Q. So are you saying this conversation you overheard 
occurred in the Jury Room? 
A. That's what that room is, yes. 
Q. Okay. Was it part of your deliberations? 
A.. No. It was at the first part of it. 
[R. 148: 25], 
The trial court dismissed Ms. Pehrson's testimony, stating that she was confused. [R. 
140-141]. The Court denied the motion for new trial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it accepted the State's explanations for using a peremptory 
challenge to exclude Ms. Lee, a Native American. The explanations given were not clear 
or specific. The explanation that the State did not want to strike a male was not neutral 
nor was the explanation about Ms. Lee's demeanor. 
The trial court abused it discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. The trial 
court's findings that Ms. Pehrson was confused and Ms. Warren was lying was not 
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supported by the evidence. The predeliberation conversations violated the trial court's 
instructions. Those violations combined with the racist treatment of Juror Warren, a 
Native American/Mexican American, corrupted the verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ACCEPTED THE 
STATE'S EXPLANATION REGARDING THE USE OF A 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
It is well established that the use of a peremptory challenge based solely on race is 
prohibited: 
Under Batson v. Kentucky [476 U.S. 79, 90, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 
901. Ed 2d 69 (1986)] and its progeny, the parties in a 
criminal action are prohibited from engaging in purposeful 
racial discrimination in exercising peremptory challenges of 
potential jurors . . . Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49, 
112 S.Ct 2348, 120 L.Ed. 2d 33 (1992). 
State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996). 
In determining whether a peremptory challenge can withstand a Batson challenge, 
the courts have utilized a three-step test: 
Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a 
peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination (step 1), the burden of production shifts 
to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-
neutral explanation (step 2). If a race-neutral explanation is 
tendered, the trial court must then decide (step 3) whether the 
opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial 
discrirnination. Purkett v. Elem, [514] U.S. [765], 115 S.Ct. 
1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834,839 (1995)(per curiam) accord State 
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v. Cantu, US P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989). 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. 
In the case at hand, Mr. Redhorse made a Batson challenge to the prosecutor's use 
of a peremptory challenge. The State conceded that the juror was Native American and 
offered an explanation. By doing so, the State waived the first step that Mr. Redhorse 
make a prima facie case of racial discrimination. State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d 401,403 
(Utah 1996)("Where the proponent of the peremptory challenge fails to contest the 
sufficiency of the prima facie case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal explanation for 
the challenge, the issue of whether a prima facie case was established is waived.") 
quoting Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547. 
As for the second step, the prosecutor gave three different reasons. Initially, it was 
because he knew more about the other jurors and their families. Then he added that he 
did not want an all female jury. Finally, the prosecutor stated that he believed Ms. Lee to 
be reserved, meek, not assertive and unwilling to take a stand. 
In order to determine if the reasons can withstand a Batson challenge, the trial 
court must determine that the reason(s) is (1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, 
(3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate. Higgenbottom, 917 P.2d at 548. 
The initial response was that the prosecutor kept jurors whom he knew or had 
knowledge about their families. This was not a reason that was related to the case being 
tried nor was it legitimate. The prosecution is not entitled to jurors that are known to 
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him. 
Additionally, that reason was not clear or reasonably specific: It did not 
explain why he chose to strike Ms. Lee instead of another juror. The same is true of the 
second reason (that he did not want an all female jury). That did not explain why he 
chose to strike Ms. Lee instead of another juror. 
More importantly, the explanation that he did not want to strike all the men from 
the jury was neither neutral nor legitimate: 
[W]hen persons are excluded from participation in our 
democratic processes solely because of [either] race or 
gender, [the] promise of equity dims, and the integrity of our 
judicial system is jeopardized, [citation omitted] Moreover, 
the Court categorically stated that "failing to provide jurors 
the same protection against gender discrimination as race 
discrimination could frustrate the purpose of Batson itself."... 
Accordingly, [J.KB. v. Alamba, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 
1419, 128 L.Ed 2d 89 (1994)] mandates that whether the 
perceived discrimination involves race or gender, the 
responsible party must provide a facially neutral explanation 
for the strike or the peremptory challenge violates equal 
protection. 
State v. Chatwin, 58 P.3d 867, 871 (Utah 2002) cert denied, 67 P.3d 495 (UT 2003): 
The fact mat the prosecutor stated that Ms. Lee was reserved, meek and quiet was 
based on the briefest of observations. Here, Ms. Lee answered the trial court's limited 
voir dire. There is no indication that she was reluctant to answer questions. That the trial 
court agreed that she was reserved adds little. Being reserved does not indicate bias nor 
does it mean that a person is not assertive or unwilling to take a stand. Yet, that is 
11 
precisely what the prosecution concluded. 
This conclusion disregards cultural differences. There are longer pauses, less 
volume and more specific responses to questions from Native Americans than Anglos. To 
disregard these cultural differences and use that difference as a basis to exclude is race 
specific, not race neutral. 
The prosecution's concern was that Ms. Lee would be not take a stand against Mr. 
Redhorse, another Native American. 
Point 2: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTTON 
FOR NEW TRIAL. 
In State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that although Rule 606 (b), Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits impeaching a verdict by 
allowing a juror to discuss what happened during deliberations, the rule should be 
different when the fairness of a trial was implicated. 
In the case at hand, two jurors engaged in predetermination discussion regarding 
Mr. Redhorse's guilt and those two jurors were the same ones that carried the verdict, to 
the point that one acted in a racist manner toward a minority juror. Such misconduct 
implicates the fairness of the trial and violates due process of law. Utah Constitution, 
Article 1, Section 7, United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment. 
Here, both Jurors Pehrson and Warren stated that they overheard comments by 
Jurors Vigil and Young. Juror Pehrson testified that she overheard either Juror Vigil or 
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Juror Young make the comment that Mr. Redhorse was guilty during a break on the first 
day of trial. This was before any evidence was given at trial. 
Juror Jerri Lynn Warren stated that during one of the first breaks in the waiting 
area, Ms. Vigil commented to Ms. Young that Mr. Redhorse was guilty and further stated 
that they should not be talking about the matter. During her testimony, Ms. Warren broke 
down and cried, stating that her vote was forced by Ms. Vigil's racist attitude toward her 
during deliberations. 
The trial court found that Ms. Pehrson was confused and that the comment she 
heard took place during deliberations. This finding was in direct contradiction with Ms. 
Pehrson's testimony. She clearly stated that the conversation took place on the first day 
of trial, not during deliberations. 
The trial court dismissed the testimony of Ms. Warren because it found 
implausible the claim mat Ms. Vigil could be racist based on her marriage to a Mexican 
American. The trial court also faulted Warren's 'evident dislike' for Ms. Vigil and 
found her less credible because she cried during the testimony that she was subject to 
racism in the deliberations. 
The assumption that a person who is married to a Mexican American would not be 
prejudiced against another who is of Mexican American and Native American descent 
demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding about racism. Furthermore, that Ms. 
Warren cried when she testified about the racism or disliked someone who treated her in 
13 
such a manner are not bases to undermine credibility. To be a victim of racism would be 
naturally evoke a variety emotions. 
Thus, the trial court's findings were an abuse of discretion. 
In the case at hand, Mr. Redhorse had the constitutional right to a fair and 
impartial jury. See generally, Utah Constitution, Article 1 Section 12, United States 
Constitution, Sixth Amendment; Logan City v. Cartsen, 799 P2d 224, 225 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) ("The right to trial by a fair and impartial jury is an important one which 
should be scrupulously safeguarded" quoting State v. Durand, 569 P2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 
1977). But, Mr. Redhorse, a Native American, was tried by a jury in which the only 
other Native American testified that she was treated in a racist manner and forced into 
voting a guilty. In addition, the juror that acted in a racist manner is the one that was 
overheard telling another juror that Mr. Redhorse was guilty during a break on the tint 
day of trial. A second juror overheard a similar conversation the first day of trial, prior to 
any evidence being heard. At best, the appearance of impropriety is raised as to whether 
Mr. Redhorse received a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the conviction of Mr. 
Redhorse. 
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Utah State Constitution 
Article 1, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article 1, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury6 of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure rights therein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person by twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
United States Constitution. 
Fifth Amendment 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use without just compensation. 
Sixth Amendment 
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and the cause of the accusations; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense. 
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